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Executive Summary 
 
In October 2014, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University 
published an impact assessment study of community-based violence prevention programs that have 
been implemented under the umbrella of the US State Department’s Central American Regional 
Security Initiative (CARSI). The study looked at survey data measuring public perceptions of crime 
in 127 treatment and control neighborhoods in municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Panama where the violence prevention programs have been implemented. The study’s authors 
stated that the data shows that “in several key respects the programs have been a success” and note, 
for instance, that 51 percent fewer residents of “treated” communities reported being aware of 
murders and extortion incidents during the previous 12 months, and 19 percent fewer residents 
reported having heard about robberies having occurred.  
 
As the LAPOP study is, to date, the only publicly accessible impact assessment of programs carried 
out under CARSI — a notoriously opaque regional assistance scheme that has received hundreds of 
millions of dollars of US government funding — a thorough review of the LAPOP study data 
seemed appropriate. 
 
The following report examines the data collected during the LAPOP study and subjects them to a 
number of statistical tests. The authors find that the study cannot support the conclusion that the 
areas subject to treatment in the CARSI programs showed better results than those areas that were 
not. 
 
This report identifies major problems with the LAPOP study, namely, the nonrandomness of the 
selection of treatment versus control areas and how the differences in initial conditions, as well as 
differences in results between treatment and control areas, have been interpreted. In the case of 
reported robberies, if the areas subject to treatment have an elevated level of reported robberies in 
the year prior to treatment, it is possible that there is some reversion to normal levels over the next 
year. The LAPOP methodology does not differentiate between effective treatment and, for example, 
an unrelated decline in reported robberies in a treated area following a year with an abnormally high 
number of reported robberies. The series of statistical tests in this report indicate that this possibility 
is quite plausible, and cannot be ruled out; and that the LAPOP study, therefore, does not 
demonstrate a statistically significant positive effect of treatment. The same can be said for the other 
variables where the LAPOP study finds significant improvement. 
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Introduction 
 
In 2007, President George W. Bush created the Merida Initiative, a regional response to rising 
violence and drug trafficking in Mexico and Central America. In 2010, the Obama administration 
separated the Central American countries from the Merida Initiative with the creation of a new 
program known as the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Between fiscal year 
2008 and fiscal year 2015, the US appropriated at least $1.2 billion of assistance to Central America 
through these two initiatives, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS).1  
 
Following the large increase in migration from Central American countries, especially of 
unaccompanied minors in 2014, the US government proposed significantly increasing its 
expenditures in the region, with a focus on the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador. Billed as a new form of assistance aimed at mitigating the dire economic 
conditions and extraordinarily high levels of violence in these three countries, the Obama 
administration’s 2015 Strategy for Engagement in Central America greatly increases the budget for 
CARSI. For fiscal year 2016, $349 million dollars has been allocated for CARSI, up from $170 
million in fiscal year 2015.2 
 
The stated goals of CARSI are to assist law enforcement and security forces in dealing with drug 
trafficking, organized crime, and gang activity throughout the region; increase the capacity and 
accountability of the region’s governments; and strengthen state and security apparatus presence in 
at-risk communities.3 Beyond these broad goals, relatively little is known about CARSI, since the  US 
government has so far failed to publish detailed information on how the program’s funds are being 
used in each country.   
 
CARSI programs have increasingly come under fire, with human rights groups as well as members 
of Congress criticizing the US government for not doing enough to combat corruption and human 
rights abuses perpetrated by the region’s increasingly militarized security forces.4 For several years, 
dozens of members of Congress have called for the complete suspension of security assistance to 
Honduras, one of the top recipients of CARSI aid, due to abuses — some documented, others 
alleged — by police and military forces and frequent killings of activists with impunity.  
 
                                                 
1 Meyer and Seelke (2015). 
2 US House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations (2015).  
3 US Department of State. “Central America Regional Security Initiative.” 
4 Main (2015).  
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There is little indication that the hundreds of millions of dollars that the US government has poured 
into CARSI have had a net positive impact. As CRS noted in a December 2015 report on CARSI, 
“most country-level security indicators have yet to show significant improvements.”5 Though the 
State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs claims to be 
carrying out regular assessments of CARSI programs, it hasn’t published these assessments or 
revealed the metrics that it employs.6 
 
To date, only one in-depth assessment of a CARSI program has been published. In October 2014, 
the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University published a study 
titled, “Impact Evaluation of USAID’s Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention 
Approach in Central America: Regional Report for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Panama.”7 The study, conducted in 2013 with the support of the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), seeks to assess the impact of CARSI-funded community based crime and 
violence prevention programs carried out by USAID in municipalities located in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. Though the State Department hasn’t specified how much 
funding these programs have received, itemized budgetary breakdowns in appropriations legislation 
show that USAID receives a relatively small proportion of the total funding provided for CARSI. 
 
The LAPOP study’s findings — based on a survey of public perceptions of crime in both “treated” 
and “control” communities in the four countries — suggest that the prevention programs have been 
successful. For instance, according to the study, 51 percent fewer residents of “treated” communities 
reported being aware of murders and extortion incidents during the previous 12 months, and 19 
percent fewer residents reported having heard about robberies having occurred. The results of the 
study have been frequently cited by the State Department and USAID as “evidence that these kinds 
of programs are working.”8 
 
Given that this study is the only publicly available impact assessment of a CARSI program and is 
being used by the US government to justify continued and increased investment in CARSI, a 
thorough review of the LAPOP study seems appropriate. 
 
The following report examines the data collected during the LAPOP study and subjects them to a 
number of statistical tests. The authors find that the study cannot support the conclusion that the 
areas subject to treatment in the CARSI programs showed better results than those areas that were 
not. 
                                                 
5 Meyer and Seelke (2015). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Berk-Seligson et al (2014).  
8 Hogan (2014).  
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The main problem in the LAPOP study is the nonrandomness of the selection of treatment versus 
control areas, and how the differences in initial conditions, as well as differences in results between 
treatment and control areas, were interpreted. For example, in the case of reported robberies, if the 
areas subject to treatment have an elevated level of reported robberies in the year prior to treatment, 
it is possible that there is some reversion to normal levels over the next year. The LAPOP 
methodology does not differentiate between effective treatment and, for example, an unrelated 
decline in reported robberies in a treated area following a year with an abnormally high number of 
reported robberies The series of statistical tests in this paper indicate that this possibility is quite 
plausible, and cannot be ruled out; and that the LAPOP study, therefore, does not demonstrate a 
statistically significant positive effect of treatment. The same can be said for the other variables 
where the LAPOP study finds significant improvement. 
 
As a result, there is still no evidence that the CARSI program has produced positive results. 
 
 
An Examination of the Data  
 
This paper focuses on the data from the LAPOP survey question on robbery — the first indicator 
of interest to the study authors. The question asked to survey respondents in control and treatment 
areas in three rounds of surveys (pretreatment, midterm, and final) was: “Have robberies occurred 
over the last twelve months in [name of neighborhood]?”9 The study authors note: “Regionally, 19% 
fewer surveyed residents reported cases of robberies than would be expected without USAID 
intervention,” and “the greatest decrease in reported robberies can be found in Honduras, with 35% 
fewer cases of robberies being reported to the interviewer conducting the LAPOP survey.”10 
 
An examination of the data, however, shows that the areas in the treatment group were — before 
any treatment — considerably different from the control areas. On average, respondents in areas 
scheduled for future treatment were 0 to 4 percentage points more likely than those in control areas 
to say they knew of robberies in the neighborhood during the previous 12 months.11 
 
After treatment, however, the respondents in the treated areas were 3 to 7 percentage points less 
likely to indicate that they were aware of robberies in their neighborhood. This seems to suggest that 
intervention, on average, reduced exposure to robbery among those in treated areas. 
                                                 
9 Berk-Seligson et al (2014), p. 32. 
10 Ibid.  
11 See Appendix for the regression model, results, and more detail.  
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However, once country, municipality, and community random effects and controls for several 
socioeconomic indicators are included in the model, the process works differently. Once these 
controls were applied, the authors found that, in the pretreatment phase, those in areas to be treated 
were 4 to 12 percentage points more likely to report being aware of robberies than people in the 
control areas. In a close replication based on the available data, the difference, pretreatment, was 6 
to 10 percentage points. 
 
The fact that respondents in pretreatment control areas appear to be less prone to robbery than ones 
in areas to be treated — once geography and socioeconomic variables are accounted for — suggests 
that the areas selected for treatment may not be sufficiently similar to the control areas to safely 
conclude that the interventions helped. 
 
With areas to be treated selected at random within municipalities, pretreatment survey results there 
ought to be similar to results in the control areas. Of course, researchers may get unlucky. With only 
a small number of areas surveyed in each municipality, the treatment and control groups may be 
quite different. For example, in Esquipulas, Guatemala, 32 percent of those surveyed pretreatment 
in areas to be treated said that they had heard of robberies in their neighborhood in the last 12 
months; only 19 percent gave the same response in the control areas — a difference both 
economically and statistically significant. 
 
Even after controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors, it is statistically unlikely that the rates 
of robbery reporting pretreatment were similar in treatment and control areas of the municipality. 
The authors observe a statistically significant difference in pretreatment rates of reported robberies 
in 11 of the 14 municipalities surveyed; in 8 of the 11, the treatment area reported more robberies 
than in the control area (see Table 1).  
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TABLE 1 
Differences in Reported Robberies by Municipality 
 Number of Municipalities (Number of Respondents) 
  Treatment < Control Treatment > Control 
P<0.01 2 (1888)  5 (3523) 
0.01<P<0.05 1 (576) 3 (1424) 
0.05<P<0.1 0 1 (988) 
P>0.1 2 (866) 0 
Chi2 = 4.5, p=21% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by the LAPOP Project at Vanderbilt University.  
 
Though treated areas were not as a group statistically more likely to have respondents report 
robberies at higher rates, the sample size was particularly small. Fifty-five percent of respondents lived 
in municipalities where robbery reporting rates differed between treatment and control at the 1 
percent level of statistical significance with another 23 percent below the 5 percent threshold. 
 
How one interprets this kind of nonrandomness in the selection of areas for treatment may make a 
big difference in how the effects of treatment are modeled. If one considers a municipality where 
robbery reporting was higher in the treated area than in the control, this may be due to unlucky 
selection for treatment of fundamentally high-robbery areas. On the other hand, it may be unlucky 
not because treatment areas were fundamentally high-robbery, but merely because they happened in 
the previous year to have had a relatively high rate of robbery. 
 
In the first case, a good baseline assumption would be that low-robbery control areas pretreatment 
will continue to be low-robbery areas after treatment. Thus, if after treatment, those surveyed in the 
high-robbery areas report robberies at rates closer to the control, then this reduction in crime may 
be attributed to the treatment. 
 
In the second case, where the areas selected for treatment have simply experienced a relatively high-
robbery year, a good baseline assumption would be that high-robbery treatment areas will see their 
robbery reporting rates fall toward control. Because 69 percent of respondents lived in 
municipalities with elevated robbery in the areas to be treated, one would expect a natural fall in 
reported robberies relative to control areas. 
 
Therefore, interpretation of a statistically significant fall in reported robberies in treated areas 
depends on how one accounts for the pretreatment difference in reported robbery rates relative to 
control areas. One way to distinguish between these accounts would be to investigate whether control 
areas with high robbery rates prior to treatment had relatively low rates in the posttreatment period, 
compared to control areas in other municipalities. Indeed, municipalities which had high control rates 
 Have US-Funded CARSI Programs Reduced Crime and Violence in Central America?  
An Examination of LAPOP’S Impact Assessment of US Violence Prevention Programs in Central America 
7 
 
of robbery reports pretreatment also had high control rates of robbery after treatment. This is seen in 
Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Robbery Reports in Control Areas Before and After Intervening in Treatment Areas 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by the LAPOP Project at Vanderbilt University. 
 
Regression robust to outliers shows that every percentage point increase in the rate of reported 
robberies pretreatment in control areas is associated with an additional 0.25 to 1.0 percentage points 
after intervention (see Appendix). Note that the rate of reported robberies in control areas of 
Choloma, Honduras increased by an unusually large amount. Rather than falling from 37 percent to 
an expected 31 percent, as the regression would predict, the rate jumped to 67 percent. 
 
Figure 2 is identical to Figure 1 except that the treatment areas have been added in lighter blue. The 
regression line is unchanged — still based solely on the control areas.  
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FIGURE 2 
Robbery Reports Adding Treatment Areas Before and After Intervening 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by the LAPOP Project at Vanderbilt University. 
 
One can see that the relationship between pre- and posttreatment control areas does a good job of 
helping predict reported robberies in posttreatment areas of intervention.  
 
Statistically, the possibility that intervention had no effect on reported robberies cannot be ruled 
out.12 In particular, the treated areas of Choloma posttreatment look very much like one would expect 
given its high pretreatment rate of robbery. Figure 3 shows the estimated effect of intervention on areas as 
a function of pretreatment rate. 
  
                                                 
12 See Appendix Table A1, column 2 
 Have US-Funded CARSI Programs Reduced Crime and Violence in Central America?  
An Examination of LAPOP’S Impact Assessment of US Violence Prevention Programs in Central America 
9 
 
FIGURE 3 
Effect of Intervention on Rate of Reported Robbery 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by the LAPOP Project at Vanderbilt University. 
 
Though this analysis cannot rule out the possibility that there is no effect from intervention, the 
sample size has been reduced greatly from the thousands surveyed. The test may simply lack the 
power to detect a small effect. 
 
Nevertheless, this expanded model suggests that for control areas 10 additional percentage points in 
the pretreatment rate of robbery results in an additional fall of 0.5 to 6.8 percentage points over the 
period of intervention. 
 
As a check, the authors looked not at the rate of reported robbery, but the difference between that 
rate and the rate for the corresponding country’s control areas. Figure 4 below is identical to Figure 
2, but uses this excess rate rather than the raw reported robberies rate. 
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FIGURE 4 
Robbery Reports Adding Treatment Areas Before and After Intervening 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by the LAPOP Project at Vanderbilt University. 
 
Again, it cannot be said that treated areas behave differently than control areas. But the authors find 
that for every percentage point that a control area’s rate exceeds the country pretreatment control 
average, the rate falls 0.2 to 0.8 over the course of intervention. That is, something on the order of 
half the difference vanishes over time with no intervention. This is reasonable evidence that unusual 
rates of reported robbery are not entirely persistent. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, then, if treatment areas happen to have, on average, unusually high rates pretreatment 
relative to control, one may see an effect of the intervention — even if no such effect exists — 
unless controlled for expected reversion to the mean. 
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Now, the LAPOP study’s authors assume that pretreatment differences between treatment and 
control areas are persistent, and so they do not worry about reversion to the mean. If one assumes 
otherwise, as the data seems to suggest, then the study’s original models must be expanded to 
account for those transitory differences. 
 
As a check, the authors repeat the original study using municipality interactions with all the 
independent variables — much akin to performing separate estimates for each municipality. Figure 
5 shows the estimated effect of treatment on each municipality. The original (constant) treatment 
effect, found by the LAPOP study, is shown by the gray horizontal line, with the dotted lines 
indicating a 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
FIGURE 5 
Treatment Effects by Municipality 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by the LAPOP Project at Vanderbilt University. 
 
In Figure 5, the municipalities are placed along the horizontal axis by the difference in average 
pretreatment survey response on reported robberies between treatment and control areas. That is, 
treatment areas with low rates of reported robberies relative to their corresponding control areas 
 Have US-Funded CARSI Programs Reduced Crime and Violence in Central America?  
An Examination of LAPOP’S Impact Assessment of US Violence Prevention Programs in Central America 
12 
 
(left) saw robberies rise posttreatment when compared to the control. Unsurprisingly, intervention 
saw the greatest negative effect in Choloma, Honduras, where robbery reports in the control areas 
rose very rapidly. It seems that successful intervention required high pretreatment robbery rates. 
The pattern holds for other indicators as well, since these indicators are related; for example, 
respondents more likely to report robberies in their neighborhood may be less likely to trust the 
police. For all 16 indicators there is a negative relationship between the initial difference between 
treatment and control rates and the supposed effectiveness of the intervention (see Figure 6).  
 
It can be seen that the target variables improved more after treatment in areas with relatively poor 
pretreatment levels, but it is not clear that these target variables improved any more than would be 
expected without treatment, given the observed pretreatment rates 
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FIGURE 6 
Treatment Effects By Municipality — All Indicators 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by the LAPOP Project at Vanderbilt University. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Study Models 
Take the example of reported robberies — the first indicator of interest. The study results are 
shown in Table A1. 
 
TABLE A1 
Respondent-Level Regression Results 
 
Study: Without 
Controls 
Study: As Published 
Partial Replication 
with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment area (β2) 1.9 (1.1)# 7.8 (2.1)*** 7.6 (1.0)*** 
Posttreatment (β1) -5.7 (1.1)*** -5.5 (1.0)*** -5.9 (1.1)*** 
Treatment (β3) -7.2 (1.5)*** -7.9 (1.4)*** -7.3 (1.4)*** 
Constant (β0) 42 (0.8)*** 31 (6)*** 33.3 (6)*** 
R2 0.01   
Note: treated - control 
after treatment (β2+β3) 
-5.3 (1.0)***  0.4 (1.0) 
# 10%, * 5%, **1%, ***0.1% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data supplied by the LAPOP Project at Vanderbilt University. 
 
Starting with column 1 — the simplest model may be written:  
 
𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
On the left-hand side is a scaled indicator (0/100) variable. A zero says the ith respondent was not 
aware of a robbery in the neighborhood within the last 12 months; otherwise, Robbery is 100. Now, 
prior to intervention in the treatment areas, 42 percent of those in control areas said they knew of 
robberies in their neighborhoods in the previous 12 months. Subsequently, the rate fell 5.7 
percentage points. The control area initial rate and fall are modeled as β0 and β1, respectively. 
PostTreatment is a time-based indicator variable equal to 1 after the interventions in treatment areas, 
so β0+β1 would be the estimated posttreatment rate, as seen in Figure A1. 
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FIGURE A1 
Estimated Robbery Rates in Control Areas — Before and After Interventions 
 
Source: Authors’ model 
 
The model estimates are uncertain, so the authors see the likely range for β0 to be 40 to 43. That is, 
based on this model, the authors expect 40 to 43 percent of pre-intervention respondents in control 
areas to report a robbery. Likewise, the authors estimate that the rate fell 3.6 to 7.8 percentage points 
(based around a 95 percent confidence interval for β1, column 1) post-intervention even though no 
interventions were made in those areas. 
 
Now, prior to intervention, respondents in areas awaiting treatment were marginally more likely to 
report awareness of at least one robbery in the previous year. If the interventions had no effect, then one 
might expect the rate in treatment areas to fall 3.6 to 7.8 percentage points — just as in the control 
areas. Thus, regardless of the time period, one would expect rates in treatment areas to be 0 to 4 
percentage points above that of the control areas. This treatment-area effect is modeled as β2 where 
TreatmentArea is another (geographic) indicator set to 1 if the respondent lived in an area subject to 
intervention. This can be seen in Figure A2. 
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FIGURE A2 
Assumed Counterfactual Rates in Treatment Areas If No Effect from Intervention 
 
Source: Authors’ model 
 
So prior to intervention, the estimated rate in treatment areas would be β0+β2. Post-intervention, the 
estimated counterfactual rate would be β0+β1+β2 (the difference being β1, just as in the control 
areas). 
 
It turns out, however, that those treatment areas reported robberies at even lower rates post-
intervention; this difference is assumed to be due to intervention. The treatment effect is 
represented by β3 where Treatment is a final indicator that is 1 if the respondent lived in an actually 
treated area. That is, Treatment is 1 if and only if both TreatmentArea and PostTreatment are also 1. 
Thus, the post-intervention rate in the treatment areas would be β0+β1+β2+ β3, as seen in Figure 
A3.  
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FIGURE A3 
Complete Study Model (Without Controls) 
 
Source: Authors’ model 
 
Including uncertainty in the estimates, the LAPOP study authors infer that the interventions 
lowered reported robberies by 4 to 10 percentage points. However, this is not the full model used in 
their study. The full model includes additional control variables:  
 
𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽𝑋 + 𝜋𝑖
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Here, Xi represents a vector of individual socioeconomic indicators with coefficient vector βX; πi is a 
constant random effect corresponding to the respondent’s country, μi for the municipality, and κi for 
the community. With these additional controls in their model, the LAPOP authors find β2 to be 
between 3.6 and 11.9 (95 percent confidence interval).13 That is, pre-intervention, those in treated 
areas reported robbery at a rate some 7.7 percentage points higher than those in control areas. 
 
                                                 
13 See Table A1, column 2. 
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Though the data necessary to reproduce these results are not available, column 3 of Table A1 shows 
a close replication based on the supplied data. All three models suggest similarly sized effects of 
intervention (β3). 
 
 
Added Models 
Moving beyond the models presented in the LAPOP study, the authors shift from examining the 
survey results at the respondent level to modeling the area-level average posttreatment responses 
using observed pretreatment averages.14 The baseline model (see Table A2, column 1, “Post-Treatment 
Rate, Control Areas Only”) is very simple. Using control areas only, 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,0 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
where Ratei,0 is the pretreatment rate for area i, and Ratei,1 is the corresponding posttreatment rate. 
 
Column 2 (“Post-Treatment Rate, All Areas”) of Table A2 expands on this by including treatment 
areas. This model adds a complete set of interactions for treatment area, though a joint F-test shows 
that these additional variables add nothing important — the treatment areas are effectively identical 
to control areas once pretreatment rates are accounted for. 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,0 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,0 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 × 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,0 + 𝜀𝑖 
  
                                                 
14 “Area” is defined here as (alternatively) the aggregate neighborhoods — control or treatment — within a single municipality. That is, 
there are exactly two observations per municipality. 
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TABLE A2 
Area-Level Regression Results 
 
Posttreatment Rate 
Posttreatment Rate – Country’s 
Control Average 
 
Control Areas 
Only 
All Areas 
Control Areas 
Only 
All Areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pretreatment rate 
(β1) 
0.65 (0.18)*** 0.66 (0.16)*** 0.49 (0.19)* 0.48 (0.16)** 
Pretreatment rate 
^ (β3) 
 0.04 (0.24)  -0.10 (0.19) 
constant ^ (β2)  -4 (11)  -0.5 (3.4) 
constant (β0) 6.9 (7.7) 5.3 (6.9) -1.3 (2.9) -1.3 (2.4) 
Note: Joint F-stat 
[p] testing all zero 
interactions 
(β2=β3=0) 
 0.16 [0.86]  0.14 [0.87] 
Note: Mean 
reversion (β1 – 
1.0) 
-0.35 (0.18)# -0.34 (0.16)* -0.51 (0.19)* -0.51 (0.16)* 
Source and Notes: Authors’ model 
Regressions are robust to outliers 
^ Interacted with indicator for treatment area 
# 10%, * 5%, **1%, ***0.1% 
 
In column 3 (“Posttreatment Rate ― Country’s Control Average, Control Areas Only”), the authors 
use the same model as column 1, but subtract the country-wide rate pooling over respondents in all 
its control areas. If the country-j average Pj,0 is pretreatment and Pj,1 is posttreatment, then for control 
areas only: 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,1 − 𝑃𝑗,1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,0 − 𝑃𝑗,0) + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Finally, column 4 (“Posttreatment Rate ― Country’s Control Average, All Areas”) is similarly 
expanded to include treatment areas of each municipality. 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,1 − 𝑃𝑗,1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,0 − 𝑃𝑗,0) + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖
× (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,0 − 𝑃𝑗,0) + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Note that Pj,t are still defined exclusively by the aggregate control areas of the country; for a 
treatment area, Ratei,t-Pj,t is the municipality’s treatment area average for the period, less the 
country’s control average for the period. 
